



Dag hammarskjold's role in the development of peacekeeping

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Abstract

The issue under investigation is urgent as the modern world is experiencing widespread armed conflicts to settle which the United Nations is conducting peacekeeping operations, thus the study of the development of the concept of peacekeeping operations will now help find the most optimal form of such conduct. The purpose of the article is to study the process of the development of the concept of peacekeeping operations and the role of the Secretary-General of the United Nations Dag Hammarskjold in it. The article deals with the formation of the concept of peacekeeping operations, a major contribution to which was introduced by the second Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold who held the post in 1953-1961. The authors examine the attempts carried out in the second half of the 1940s to create international military forces within the UN in order to respond to the threats to international peace and security. The cases of conflict resolution in the Middle East and in the Congo reveal the basic principles of Hammarskjold's peacekeeping concept as well as his systemic approach to resolving local crises in the world. The materials of the article may be useful in discussing a possible reform of the concept of the UN peacekeeping operations. The article relies on a historical and comparative method, retrospective and systematic methods.

Key words: conflict, Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dag Hammarskjold, peacekeeping operation, concept.



1. INTRODUCTION

The United Nations was established on the initiative of the leading powers of the anti-Hitler coalition in April 1945. During the first years of its operation the UN faced a number of conflicts and was forced to resolve them. The predecessor of the United Nations, the League of Nations, had failed to establish an effective mechanism to settle armed conflicts, although the Charter provided for the measures aimed at preventing armed aggression, and in particular, the mechanism of economic sanctions. Unfortunately, the League of Nations had failed to use them effectively. Ultimately, this led to the beginning of World War II.

One of the most effective and widely used tools in the arsenal of a new major international organization was peacekeeping operations.

2. METHODS

The article uses a historical and comparative method, a retrospective method, and a systematic method with the help of which the authors reveal the reasons for the evolution of the UN approach to the settlement of international conflicts and active involvement of the Secretary-General in the process. A biographical method was also used in the analysis of the activities of Dag Hammarskjöld.

3 RESULTS

A special role in the development of the concept of peacekeeping operations belonged to the Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld. In 1951, he joined the government as a non-party minister without portfolio. On April 10, 1953, he took office as the Secretary-General of the United Nations. In July 1956, Egyptian President G.A. Nasser decided to nationalize the Suez Canal, the majority of the shares was owned by the UK and France. Britain, France and Israel were dissatisfied with this decision and organized an aggression against Egypt at the end of October 1956.

The two countries - permanent members of the UN Security Council, actually blocked the work of the main body of the international community which was to take effective and urgent measures to restore peace in the Middle East. Under these circumstances, on October 31, by a majority vote, the Security Council adopted Resolution # 119 which, noting that "lack of unanimity among the permanent members of the Security Council on its 749th and 750th sessions prevented the exercise of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security" decided "to convene an emergency special session of the General Assembly, as stipulated in Resolution # 377A(5) of the General Assembly on November 3, 1950, in order to make appropriate recommendations" [8]. Thus, the initiative to resolve the Suez Crisis was transferred from the incompetent and split Security Council to the General Assembly.



The Emergency Session of the General Assembly of November 4 at its 563rd plenary meeting adopted Resolution # 998 in which the Secretary General was instructed to “within 48 hours to present a plan to create an emergency international force of the United Nations to ensure the cessation of hostilities... and to monitor the compliance of their termination” [11]. At first, the idea of creating peacekeeping forces and sending them into the conflict area was proposed by Canadian Foreign Minister Lester Pearson. The Canadian diplomat and politician showed his best side at the United Nations when he worked in a team. Most effectively, he worked in tandem with the Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld.

At the same time, on February 18, 1960, at a press conference, answering a question from a journalist, Dag Hammarskjöld said that currently there was a tendency to expect from the Secretary-General actions that had to be taken by the Security Council [5].

On June 30, the Republic of the Congo became independent and almost immediately disorders began in the country developing into armed clashes. The situation escalated to the point when Moïse Chombe, leader of Katanga, the richest province of the Congo, announced its separation and turned to Belgium for military help to restore public order. On July 1, the Congo President Kasavubu and Prime Minister P. Lumumba appealed to the UN for help against the aggression of Belgium, “The Government of the Republic of the Congo appeals urging the United Nations to provide immediate military assistance. The request is due to the introduction of Belgian troops in the Congo in violation of the contract signed between Belgium and the Republic of Congo. Under this agreement, the Belgian troops could stay in the country only at the request of the government of the Congo. There was no such a request... so we consider the action of the Belgians to be an act of aggression against our country” [3].

The United Nations responded promptly to this request. On July 14, the Security Council adopted Resolution # 143 which contained the requirement to Belgium to withdraw all its troops from the Congo and authorized the Secretary-General “after consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo to take necessary measures to assist the government in military aid which it needs” [9]. It should be emphasized that 8 members of the Security Council voted for the Resolution and 3 members abstained (China, France and Britain). Thus began one of the most complex and large-scale UN peacekeeping operations that served as a testing ground for a variety of options and techniques of peacemaking.

The basic parameters and framework of this operation were developed by Dag Hammarskjöld and stated in the reports to the Security Council. Of particular interest is the first report of July 18, 1960,



when the first units of peacekeepers from Ethiopia, Ghana, Tunisia and Morocco had already arrived in Congo and started to perform their tasks. In that report, the Secretary-General outlined the main principles of the UN peacekeeping force in the Congo.

Firstly, the sent armed forces had to be regarded as temporary security forces that stayed for certain time and for certain purposes in the country with the consent of the government.

Secondly, the UN forces in the Congo, despite the fact that they were sent at the request of the Government of the Congo and in accordance with the Security Council resolution for military assistance, had to be under the exclusive command of the United Nations represented by the Secretary-General and the Security Council.

Thirdly, the UN forces in the Congo could not participate in internal conflicts and to hold a party in them.

Fourth, the peacekeepers in Congo had to enjoy freedom of movement throughout the territory, including the province of Katanga.

Further, in his report Dag Hammarskjöld dwelt on the principle of manning peacekeeping forces. He stressed that in its operations the United Nations was always guided by the principle of non-participation in them of the troops of the countries - permanent members of the Security Council and countries with special interests in the host country. Another important principle, which was stressed by the Secretary-General, was that peacekeepers had not to be used as a means of political struggle in a host country.

One of the most important principles of peacekeeping operations was the use of armed force by peacekeepers only in self-defence.

Dag Hammarskjöld also took the initiative to use in the Congo, together with the land units of military power, police units to perform specific functions, to maintain public order and train the National Police of the Congo.

As the situation in the Congo developed, the mandate of the peacekeeping force changed. In early 1961, the situation in the Congo was still tense. The central government of the country, torn apart by contradictions, made a number of serious errors and could not control the situation. Peacekeeping forces were constrained by the mandate of the Security Council. One of the most acute problems was the problem of separatism of Katanga. The leader of the breakaway province Chombe created an effective, well-equipped army led by Belgian officers who increasingly clashed with the national army of the Congo.



The worsening situation in the country was reacted by the Security Council, which by the recommendation of Dag Hammarskjöld on February 21, 1961 adopted Resolution # 161 demanding the United Nations forces to “take all appropriate measures to prevent the outbreak of civil war in the Congo including arrangements for ceasefire, for the suspension of all military activities and for the prevention of collisions resorting, if necessary, to use force as last resort” [10].

Thus, the Security Council, having received information from the Secretary-General and his representative in the Congo on the deterioration of the situation and the beginning of the armed struggle between the national army of the Congo and the army of Katanga, made major changes in the peacekeeping forces mandate. Prior to this resolution, the UN forces had the right to use weapons only as last resort and only in self-defence. After the adoption of the Resolution, the peacekeepers were given the right to be the first to use armed force when carrying out their tasks. This decision played a decisive role for the future actions of peacekeepers in the Congo and made a significant contribution to the development of the concept of peacekeeping.

The main goals and objectives of the peacekeeping mission did not change fundamentally over the four years. However, the methods used to carry them out changed a few times.

The four resolutions of the main UN body, adopted during the peacekeeping operation in that country, directly regarded the powers of the “blue helmets”. Each of these resolutions authorized the extension of the operation and at the same time restricted the methods of the operation.

Initially, the Security Council by the Resolution of 14 July 1960 authorized the intervention of the United Nations and called for the withdrawal of Belgian troops from the Congo. The Resolution also authorized the Secretary-General to provide necessary military and technical assistance to the central government of the country to restore and maintain law and order. Later, the United Nations reached an agreement with the central government of the Congo on the freedom of movement of the peacekeeping forces throughout the country. However, the decisive rejection of Chombe to allow the peacekeepers enter, in his opinion, the sovereign state of Katanga and his open statement in favour of the armed resistance to the “intervention” of the United Nations, forced Hammarskjöld to reconsider the position regarding the mandate and powers of the “blue helmets” in the country. The original Resolution did not allow the peacekeepers to use military force, but after the speech of Chombe it became clear that they would have to apply it in the province of Katanga. On August 9, in its Resolution the Security Council condemned Chombe’s provocative bellicose statements against the peacekeepers and reiterated the authority of the Secretary-General to resolve the Congolese Crisis. The members of the Security Council extended the mandate powers calling for the immediate



withdrawal of Belgian troops from the country and authorizing the entry of peacekeepers in Katanga in order to implement the resolution of 14 July. To allay Chombe's concerns, who feared violent suppression of the sovereignty of the province, the Resolution stressed that the UN forces would not intervene in the resolution of domestic problems [1].

Although the Resolution did not allow the UN forces to use military force, it warned Chombe and allowed the peacekeepers to enter the breakaway province. However, it could not alleviate the situation for the military contingent who were trying to restore order in the country plunging into turmoil.

By February 1961 the central government of the country had committed a number of serious mistakes and could no longer function effectively. The UN forces were able to operate only within a limited mandate. However, even though part of the country achieved certain stabilization, the problem of separatism of Katanga remained still acute. Chombe managed to establish an effective, well-equipped army headed by Belgian officers personally loyal to him and his government, and volunteers serving solely for money. The murder of Lumumba in Katanga caused sharp reaction of the Soviet Union which demanded to immediately arrest Chombe and end the civil war in the country. Meanwhile, there were intensified clashes between the army of Chombe and the units of the national army of Congo. The Baluba tribes in the north of Katanga opposed Chombe and began an armed struggle against his supporters. The UN forces were caught between two fires. Since they could not be first to use force, they failed to stop the bloody conflicts.

The UN Security Council responded to the change in the situation in the country on February 21, 1961, approving Resolution # 4741 which authorized the peacekeeping forces to use any means including armed force to stop the civil war in the Congo. The Resolution also demanded immediate withdrawal of Belgian troops and the military of other countries outside the framework of the United Nations [7]. These measures could significantly weaken the military power of the province of Katanga. In addition, the Resolution provided the commanders of the peacekeepers with the right to use military force to prevent civil war and to solve the problem of separatism of Katanga. However, the Resolution did not allow the peacekeeping units to conduct offensive operations.

When the government of Adul came to power in August 1961, the situation somewhat stabilized. However, the voltage increased in the rebellious province itself. The peacekeepers and Chombe's army closely monitored each other's manoeuvres while the leadership of the United Nations and the central government tried to negotiate with Chombe. As a result, it became clear that the government



did not have enough financial and military resources to fight separatism of Chombe. The result was a stalemate.

In September, the peacekeepers faced a new challenge in the breakaway province. In particular, in early September, the peacekeepers clashed with Chombe's army and the initiative came from them. The peacekeeping forces and the United Nations were immediately criticized by the world press and some Western countries, especially Britain and France. Prior to this incident, the UN politely but firmly refused to support any side in the conflict over Katanga. Subsequently, however, the Security Council by the Resolution of 24 November 1961 took up a clear position in support of the government of the Congo. The Resolution expressed regret over the September conflict and at the same time rejected the independence of Katanga proclaimed by Chombe. The Resolution demanded to stop separatist activities on the whole territory of the Congo and noted that the central government enjoyed full support of the United Nations. In addition, the Resolution authorized decisive actions of the peacekeeping force including the use of armed force to arrest, disarm and deport all the foreign troops not under the UN command.

Thus, the Resolution of November 24 testified that the Security Council reached a compromise. The adoption of the Resolution meant that the United Nations decided to put an end to separatism of the rebellious province even if it had to take an active part in the hostilities on the side of the central government.

The UN peacekeeping operation in the Congo is a rather interesting and relevant example of peacemaking as it affects the problems faced by peacekeepers in the 21st century. First of all, the case of the Congo shows how complex and difficult peacekeeping operation can be. It is known that initially the Congolese Government requested to provide technical assistance to restore internal order in the country. The second request of Lumumba concerned military assistance to repel the aggression of Belgium. The leaders of the United Nations had to answer two questions. Firstly, whether the turmoil in the country was the result of political struggle between the different parties or was the result of colonial intervention in Belgium? Secondly, whether Katanga's separatism was an internal problem or the result of an aggressive intervention from the outside? In the 21st century, the United Nations are carrying out a series of peacekeeping operations most of which are on the African continent and the experience gained in the Congo in the early 1960s is used by politicians and peacekeepers today.



4 DISCUSSION

The key thoughts of Hammarskjold, embodied later in the concept of peacekeeping, were outlined in the report of the Secretary-General on November 4, 1956. According to Hammarskjold, emergency international military forces should be based on three main principles.

Firstly, they should be based in accordance with the UN Charter. This meant that the leader of these forces was appointed by the United Nations, and was responsible to the General Assembly and the Security Council. Secondly, the United Nations should entrust any country or a group of countries to form such a force as it did not have its own army there. Thirdly, these forces could be created by agreement between the member states of the UN.

Another important principle underlying Dag Hammarskjold's concept of peacekeeping was that in the Middle East the UN Emergency Force had to act with the permission of a host country. In this case, it was necessary to obtain the consent of Egypt to host peacekeeping forces. Vallensten wrote, "The most difficult for Hammarskjold were the talks with Egypt that had to give its consent to the deployment of foreign troops on its territory even though they were under the auspices of the United Nations. Recognizing the sovereignty of Egypt and at the same time stressing the importance of an early deployment of the UN peacekeeping force that would enable the withdrawal of French and British troops, Hammarskjold managed to obtain the consent for the first contingents of the United Nations to enter Egypt. The issue of the sovereignty of Egypt was then resolved by the adoption of specific procedures that ensured Egypt with the right to demand withdrawal of the UN forces" [13]. Later, in his writings, Dag Hammarskjold continued to develop the concept of peacekeeping operations. He often said, "We live in the developing world, history is constantly evolving, and to act on a predetermined plan means to sacrifice flexibility which is one of the main qualities of a diplomat". When asked in 1958 about the possibility of using Emergency Force in the Middle East to settle the Lebanese crisis, he replied, "The peacekeeping operation in the Middle East is an operation which is based on a series of extraordinary circumstances, and I would caution against a blind and mindless copying of this operation".

5 SUMMARY

At the beginning of the peacekeeping operation in the Congo Hammarskjold developed a set of basic rules that set certain relationship between the UN forces and the central government. Using these rules as a basis, he formulated the following principles of peacekeeping operations:

First: UN forces must be in subjection to the UN Secretary-General who is accountable only to the Security Council. No national unit of the UN forces has right to receive orders from their government



or the government of the Congo. All operations of the United Nations must be transparent for control and be separated from any activity sponsored by nation states.

Second: the UN should not interfere in any internal conflicts.

Third: the UN forces should have complete freedom of movement throughout the country, including the province of Katanga.

Fourth: the UN troops are authorized to use force only in self-defence and in this case have the right to use it first.

Fifth: the UN Secretary-General, after consulting the Congolese government, considers the composition of the peacekeeping forces [2].

At first glance, the mission of the UN forces was relatively simple. It consisted of five tasks:

1. To assist the government of the Congo in the restoration and maintenance of law and order.
2. To ensure the withdrawal of all foreign armed groups and political advisers not subordinate to the UN and mercenaries.
3. To prevent a civil war.
4. To restore and maintain the territorial and political integrity of the country [4].

6 CONCLUSIONS

The second Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold, who took office in 1953 at the height of the Cold War, faced a number of serious problems. International peace and security were threatened by numerous armed conflicts which the United Nations had to solve. International military forces designed to quickly restore peace and punish the aggressor seemed quite real at the end of World War II. However, the confrontation between the USSR and the United States made it impossible to create them. Moreover, this confrontation often blocked the activities of the Security Council. In these circumstances, the initiative to resolve the conflict was taken on by the Secretary-General and the General Assembly. On behalf of the General Assembly Dag Hammarskjold developed a concept of peacekeeping operations in the Suez Canal zone. The activities of the Emergency Force in the Middle East served as a model for future similar operations. Further development of the peacekeeping concept took place in 1960-1961 when Dag Hammarskjold took an active part in resolving the crisis in the Congo.



7 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The work is performed according to the Russian Government Program of Competitive Growth of Kazan Federal University.

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