How did the Islamists use the gulf between the right-wing and left-wing parties in 1962-1978?

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Abstract:

The present paper examines how the Islamists use the split between right-wing and left-wing parties in 1971- 1357. The main question is how did the Islamists use the fragmentation of the left-wing and right-wing parties during the years 1351-1341? In response to this hypothesis, it was argued that the Islamists were able to use the gap between them by trying to strengthen Islamic values and highlighting the non-Islamic nature of the left-wing and right-wing parties. From the point of view of the Islamists, the oversight must come from the context of society. From the point of view of the Islamists, during the years 1342 to 1357, the parties had no intention of gathering people in the direction intended to be meaningless. With this in mind, the Islamists, led by the clergy, look at the parties of that era with a negative attitude and not only do not rise from the point of view of the community and according to the needs of the people, but also imitation and inescapable. In fact, the linkage of groups to people and their support for the interests of the country and Islam in the political thought of clerics is of great importance. The research method of the present paper is descriptive-analytic.

Key words: Parties, right-wing parties, left-wing parties, Islamists, party split

The political situation of Iran during Pahlavi II

In the Shah's view, religion has a special place as a belief system that can play an important role in consolidating modern beliefs in the general public's image of Iran. In the government of Pahlavi, religion was generally a function of this pragmatic approach. To them, religious beliefs without self-immolation were inevitable, to the extent possible to persuade or not to be confused with the beliefs of the modern state, and beyond that relationship, the reconstruction or eradication of symbols, religious verses and values on account of superstition or reaction was inevitable. In the second Pahlavi period, the Shah, unlike his father, until he felt unnecessarily religiously appealing, was defending religion and the law and pretending to "morality" and "spirituality", in order to resolve the misunderstanding The advent of the religious community and the monarchy system is to pursue the process of changing religion and religious renewal in a more flexible way. In the light of such a policy, the Shah, in the early years of the Salvation, called people into the "spirit of Islam" and tried to "prescribe the legal and ethical standards", and "ethics and spirituality" and the necessity of "adhering to ethical and spiritual realms" (Asif, 1384: 339-338). In the era of democracy, democracy has been violent. This violence and its experience have been largely influenced by the social fragmentation of Iran and the impact of the modernization process on it. With the formation of modernization in Iran from the time of Nasir al-Din Shah and its becoming a social movement accelerated by the time of Reza Khan and also its becoming a source of legitimacy in the second, it caused various gaps such as modernism and modernity Religion, government, and so on in Iran. Modernism in Iran has three main characteristics. These three features are:

1- The basis of secularism and de-socialization;
2- Templating from the outside and reliance on foreign countries;
3- Strong centralization of the state and neglect of ethnic minorities (Monajeti, 2010: 247).

Secularism and the struggle against religion, which was one of the important policies of the Pahlavi government, created an important divide between religion and government and placed the religious class against secular and secular modernists, and during the years 42 to 57 this confrontation was such that religious forces In addition to non-political participation, they also searched for ways to undermine political participation, as well as neglect of ethnic minorities and the marginalization of ethnic minorities from political and economic grips and the focus of industrial and economic investment in the center , Created a deep divide between the center

and the margin, and placed the margin against the state and its supporters, as well as reliance on extortion On the one hand, there were gaps, millions, and religions that sought to preserve the identity and independence of the country, and on the other hand, the gaps were all strata and groups that were affiliated with foreigners. (Khaje Sarveyi and Jafarpour Kooluri, 2014: 56).

The structure of the government and political power of Mohammad Reza Shah had a number of specific characteristics that made the people not have much to do with the country's affairs:

(A) Personalization of political power: The Shah, completing the process by removing the claimants, reviving parliamentary domination and eliminating all social and political groups, called himself the King.

B) Low level of institutional integrity: the Shah after the coup of August 28, 1332, on the one hand, with the suppression of various factions and groups, and on the other hand, by deepening and extending the dominance of the system on the path of weakening political institutions and reducing the level of institutional integrity of the movement of society So that the legislature, the judiciary, and the executive were tools for implementing the Shah's plans and policies.

C) Political monopoly (closed political space): The repression of social groups has caused only a small circle of Shah's trusted relatives to play a key role in policymaking and the adoption of decisions (Mohammad Ali Pour and Rahimi Emad, 1392: 169- 168).

In the traditional Iranian society, the state is separate from and separated from the society, thus, in the final analysis, the state does not have a base and a firm support point within the community, and for this reason, there is no political legitimacy among the classes and its benefits has not represented. Thus, all social rights are members of the state, and the rights that each person, group and social class, and even the whole of society enjoy, is essentially based on the permission and will of the state, that is, the state power of any tradition, convention, contract Or the permanent law is not subject to conditionality, and this is just in the normal sense of tyranny, that is, self-voting and the secret itself. In such a society, neither law nor politics means what can grow in civil society. Construction of the government in Iran is still traditional, and experience shows that people can participate and civil society can be removed if the element of government's exclusion is eliminated. (Taheri and Safari Aman, 2009: 105).

 The triple gaps of the Iranian society during the Pahlavi era can be described as follows.

Table from Khaje Sarvey and Jafarpour Clourry, 2014: 56

In general, during the Second Pahlavi, the Shah was at the head of all powers and was the main decision-maker in the affairs of the country, but he did not have the following reasons for preventing the Islamic revolution:

First, there was no proper analysis of the people's uprising: while the movement was Islamic, he introduced the main director of the Islamic movement to the Communists.

Second, he did not have the power of decisive and independent decision-making, and he looked at his salvation by the United States and was waiting for the American guidelines.

Third: During the years of the reign, the Shah considered himself the undisputed leader of the country, and did not give any value to the government, parliament and the Rastakhiz Party. They only executed the orders of the king. Therefore, all the problems and injustices and financial and political mischief came to the king himself. (Mozaffari, 2007: 115).

The growing and continuous increase in discomfort and dissatisfaction among most of the Iranian people due to the increase in oppression in the 1970s (1350s), the promises that were given to political and economic decentralization and never worked, Also, the growth of economic problems during 1976 and 1977 (1356 and 1357 AD), despite the huge income of

oil, led to the prevalence of opposition in 1977 (1976 AD). Although the obvious opposition of the people to the king was sooner or later, the timing and form of its occurrence were partly the result of Carter's policy of human rights, which was announced in January 1977 (January 1976) and implied that Countries in which human rights are largely overlooked may be deprived of economic aid or weapons. The impact of the human rights policy in Iran was not due to the considerable pressure that the United States had allegedly entered, but because both the Shah and his opposition believed that it was really possible for the United States to do something about it. The same belief led some Iranians to find the courage to publish open letters and petitions, and hope that their contents will be taken into account in some way, and that they will be at least as suppressed and censored as they used to be. But US diplomats and political officials often refrained from pushing the Shah into a human rights issue. Frequently Asked Questions about the human rights of the Shah from the Americans were usually related to the imprisonment or torture of individuals, not the freedom of the people or their civil rights. The Americans have never seriously threatened to reduce their aid and support to the Shah's regime. Dissenting remarks and every single American human rights official helped the king to be shaken in his confidence in US support for him and his opposition to opposition groups. Carter's words were urged to work, because of their morals, although they had little practical backing. (Cadei, 1369: 342-341).

The status of parties in the second Pahlavi era

In the sense of political democrats, the party has a long history in Iran as in many societies. These political gatherings, such as the Sibdaran and Fidaeans of Ismaili, had a military dimension and functioned as a party or political-military organization, and occasionally Akhavan al-Safa affiliated with philosophy and moral philosophy, shaping it in the form of a political-cultural formation. In fact, the history of the political party in the form and within the framework of current and current definitions of parties in Iran reaches 100 years and returns to the constitutional era. (Massoudnia and Najafi, 1390: 110).

The second Pahlavi military-political structure was based on the Shah's character and revolved around his personal policy. One of the actions that the Shah did after the August 28, 1332 coup in order to destroy independent and semi-independent parties, including the Tudeh Party and the National Front, was the establishment of government parties. Many Iranian parties have been established in the last century by the government and the government. Because of non-

indigenousness, spontaneity, lack of independent bases, and the lack of a bottom-up process, these parties have created a significant deviation in the actual path of realization in Iran, and has caused more distrust and pessimism to the parties. They are Commando parties have mainly appeared in three forms in the past 100 years of Iran, parties that are reliant on a personality and formed on the basis of an individual; parties that are created by prominent brokers by order of the ruling system; parties based on Political conditions have emerged, in other words, the parties are reacting. Ordinary parties or parties that are also parties to the government are also parties to those parties that do not have deep social roots and are created in terms of individual, class or external motives. Such parties lack a coherent party organization and have no civic ideology. The gathering of members and the creation of party and ideological faith in these types of parties are confronted with many problems. These parties are called for the order in which their foundations are not natural and do not originate from the social conditions. The group and class interests of individuals and political and economic gangs are the cause of such parties (Samiy Esfahani and Mohammadi, 1393: 66). After Zahedi's coup d'état and suppressing these political currents, it would not be possible for parties to work until the third period, from 1339 to 1342. During this period, there was again a space in which some political parties and political movements, such as the 2nd National Front, the Freedom Movement and Islamic groups in the clergy, were able to enter the scene of political struggles, but it was the only clergy to raise a dispute with the royal system, and subsequently to the events May 15th appeared. With his exile, all the opposition was again repressed and the dictatorship ruled. From this date, the Shah prevented the formation of political groups and thus did not create a suitable space for all social forces. There was no connection between the government and the social classes, and the Shah disrupted all the disciplines that had previously linked the absolute monarchy to the traditional middle classes, limiting the base of his absolute monarchy and thinking of turning his absolute military rule to a fascist totalitarian state The species emerged. Thus, the most prominent political feature of the government, namely the imposition of domination and the enumeration of all groups, was formed, and only voluntary and loyal parties allowed activity, therefore, due to the monopoly of power in the hands of Mohammad Reza, the will to power in parties such as the Iqbal party, the People's Alam Party, The adventurous center of Mansour and the party of Iran-Nowin Hoveyda, which the "Shah's" parties did not matter (Akhavan Mofrad, 1375: 37-36).

The most important parties during the Pahlavi era, their nature and their performance

Tudeh Party

This party was founded in 1320 after the fall of Reza Shah and the opening up of political space to the students who returned from Europe to Iran. The Tudeh Party, which was followed by the Communist Party, is due to the law prohibiting the formation of parties in 1310, and also the fear of denying the clergy and the failure to attract the people (due to their deep religious beliefs and beliefs) The Communist Party avoided itself and took on a national and non-communist coverage. Since members of the party were a secretary, teacher, student, doctor, and laborer, they could classify them as part of a new middle class. In the first letter of the party, the concealment of its communist ideas is quite evident, as its founder pointed out to some general non-communist goals in expressing their goals. After a few years since its establishment, during the second Pahlavi period, with the provision of free activities (due to the Shah's immense weakness and bringing a significant portion of society to it), the Tudeh Party began to circulate explicitly to the left in the form of decrees and declarations. In the year 1327, following the emergence of social and political backgrounds, this turnaround was completed to the left, and it was stated in the party's essay: The worldview of the party of Iran is Marxism-Leninism, and its organizational principles derive from this worldview. Thus, a Party originally based on communist beliefs, ideologically or internationally identifiable itself as the continuation of the Communist Party, with the motto of Marxism-Leninism's worldview, has turned itself into the Iranian society Introduced. (Sam Deliri and Shahbazi, 1391: 4-3-).

Rastakhiz Party

According to some evidence and evidence, from the late 1340s, efforts were made to shift the Shah's mentality to the importance and necessity of establishing a powerful party to strengthen and secure the foundations of the Pahlavi dynasty. As deduced from the notes of Asadollah Alam, this thought was first fought by the ambassador to Tehran in April of 1348, through the knowledge of the king. The US ambassador to Assadullah Alam has said that if the king suddenly dies, there is no solid guarantee for the continuation of his rule through succession. A sovereign state requires a powerful and majority-based organization or party that can support the Pahlavi monarchy in the face of such crises. Science is likely to suggest that this single-party system is imposed on the king.

The Shah's motivation for establishing the Rastakhiz Party was to create a coherent and powerful body for consolidating the foundations of the regime, in other words, the king's

concern for the continuation of the Pahlavi regime. He knew that the administration of the country would not survive the autocracy, and as soon as death came to him, his survivors would not be able to govern the country. Hence, he sought to create an organization that would change both his own regime and his existential vacuum. On September 22, 1354, in an interview with Egyptian journalist Hassanin Hichel, Shah stated that the reason behind the establishment of the Rastakhiz Party was the establishment of the future of the Pahlavi Dynasty and the rebellion without concern of his son, Reza Pahlavi, in his place. (Jafari Movahed, 1385: 229). The main goal of the Rastakhiz Party and its establishment, like the New Iran Party, was to support the White Revolution. The Rastakhis party of the Iranian nation was established in 1979 in the course of creating a one-party system. Hoveyda was the secretary general of the Rastakhiz Party. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi identified and set up the party as one of his own mistakes. The Rastakhiz Party failed to fulfill one of its goals - to play the role of mediator between the government and the nation (Hassan Nejad and Pirmoradian, 1395: 49-48).

The Shah, at times, expressed with great concern and suspicion about the future of Western democracies, hoping in a way that they could take in the not-too-distant future to escape the crises that he encountered! He believed that Iran would be among the countries in which, especially with the ideological support that he "personally dare to present" in the form of the Resurrection Party, would easily escape the crises facing the civilized world. More sorry for the shah, meanwhile, was for the underdeveloped and underdeveloped countries a third world that he had no hope of rescuing. During his private conversation with Assadullah Alam, the Shah, during his private conversation, repeatedly mocked democracy and described the sovereign states of the democratic system as an anarchist group; among other things, when science stated, Ms. Gandhi intended to impose certain restrictions on The Indian parliament will apply, Shah said, "It does well. It's time for him to rid himself of this demonstration of ridiculous games. "(Shahedi, 2009: 26).

Organization of Fadai Khalq

The organization of the Fadaiy People was the organization of the armed forces, which was formed by the passionate youth of the bourgeois political parties (Tudeh Party and National Front) with Marxist-Leninist ideology and after the coalition of two Marxist groups in 1350. The organization, whose members were from university students and graduates. It was protesting the peaceful methods and political struggle of the other Marxist party, the Tudeh

Party. The federal guerrillas called the theory of "survival" to prepare society for revolution through theoretical and political work for being conservative. By condemning the party to a compromise, after the June 15th and land reform, and after examining the state of the country's social and economic situation, they believed that under conditions of repression and suppression of forces - that any political activity was impossible or ineffective - Only a violent struggle of guerrilla type is the knot of the current stagnation of the society. Like all other revolutionary and Marxist groups, the fedayians divided the world into two opposing and hostile camps in their own analysis of the international forces: "An army comprised of socialist countries, the working class of capitalist countries, and national liberation movements. And on the other hand, it was imperialism led by American imperialism and all the reactionaries of the world. " The reflection of this dichotomy in Iran was the formation of two hostile factions of the ruling and exploiting class on the one hand, and all the deprived and exploited on the other. The contradictory forces of the Iranian community were on the one hand at the global front. The disadvantaged community was at the front on the left, and the ruling class was led by the Pahlavi government on the front of imperialism. (Sam Deliri and Shahbazi, 1391: 9-8).

Nowin (new) Iran Party:

In 1343, a new party was formed, called Iran's Nowin Party, and Iranian Prime Minister Hassan Ali Mansour was formed as the leader of the party, and later he was assassinated by the members of the Muftheh-e-Islami group and transferred his position to Amir Abbas Hoveyda. But in 1353, the Shah changed a great deal in Iran's domestic politics, transforming the bipartisan system into a party, creating a party called Rastakhiz, and obliging members of the two parties to join the party, and other parties were obliged to join Admitting the party and declaring that all Iranians should be members of this party, and whoever does not accept the party's membership, or should go to jail or leave the country. In fact, the Shah, with the establishment of this party, openly declared that there is no need for civil institutions that provide political freedoms and the rights of the people, and that they are universal. In fact, the structure of a sovereign state, in which the role of the individual is used more than social institutions, and the parties, groups, social classes and parliament, and ... should be under the domination of the Shah (Qasemi and Kargar Jahromi, 2012: 88-87). In a book titled "Great Civilization," the king himself writes: "The special situation of the kingdom in Iran requires

that, according to famous Christian San, a true king in this country, not only the head of state, but also a teacher's tutor for his own people .... "(Shah, 1355: 17).

Mojahedin Khalq Organization of Iran

The PMOI was founded by three students from the Free Movement, founded in 1344. The leaders and members of this organization were often students and university graduates. Of the 103 members of the organization killed by the regime, 72 of them were university students and graduates. However, the job position And the class of 11 out of 103 people is unknown. The formation of the Mojahedin from the freedom movement with the thinking of the armed struggle was, as a result, influenced by the stalemate of the democratic struggle after the June 15th and the intensity of the regime's action against the fighters, as well as the global struggle against capitalism. The first act of the mujahideen leaders after the decision to form the organization was to determine and formulate the ideology of the organization. In this way, the founders of the organization, due to their deep religious tendencies, were paying attention to the Qur'an and Nahj al-Balaghah. These people were determined to discover the true truth of Islam which, in my opinion, was "hidden by the distortion of dust for centuries and class misuse." By the year 1344, these attempts had been devised to formulate an ideological or Islamic ideology based on attitude Monotheism ended. Based on this ideology, real Islam, free of falsehood and distortion, or essentially religion and prophecy, has been the originator of revolution since the beginning of history and at any time, and the only defenders of the world's righteous. (Sam Deliri and Shahbazi, 1391: 13-12). The first act of the mujahideen leaders after the decision to form the organization was to determine and formulate the ideology of the organization. In this way, the founders of the organization, due to their deep religious tendencies, were paying attention to the Qur'an and Nahj al-Balaghah. These people were determined to discover the true truth of Islam which, in my opinion, was "hidden by the distortion of dust for centuries and class misuse." By the year 1344, these attempts had been devised to formulate an ideological or Islamic ideology based on attitude Monotheism ended. According to this ideology, real Islam, free from distortions or basically religion and prophecy, has been the originator of revolution since the beginning of history and at any time, and the only defenders of the world's righteous. (Sam Deliri and Shahbazi, 1391: 13-12).

People's Party

The ideas of the formation of this party can be traced back to the growth trend of the 1320s, which is regarded as an important period in the political activities of various parties and groups (with different disciplines). In general, the process of people's party activities can be divided into three stages.

- Stabilization period: This period lasted for general secretary Amir Asadollah Alam from April 1336 to September 1339.

-Development: This course covers the general secretary general of Professor Yahy Adel, from September 1339 to May 1350.

- The period of weakening and dissolution: This period covered the period from April 1350 to the end of 1353, which was continued with the general secretary general of Alinaghi Keni, Professor Yahya Adal, Nasser Ameri and Mohammad Fazeli, and eventually declared the formation of the party of the Resurrection Unit of the Nation In April 1354, Iran, along with other official parties, was declared abolished by the government (Ghafra Marandi, 1395: 45).

The People's Party, which collapsed in 1353, faced many challenges after 1347. What the Shah expected from this party was "the tribute to the Minority Party", and it should have played this role with "noisy pace". Indeed, the coherence and follow-up of government policies are one of the main challenges facing the party. In other words, to the extent that the party was weakened by power and management, it was equally reduced by its ability to stand against the government and the majority party. The slogan "The preservation of national unity and the integrity of the nation" was a privilege that the People's Party repeatedly reciprocated with its appeal to the majority of Iran. One of the SAVAK bulletins dated 2/10/1349 highlighted the causes of the failures and weaknesses of the People's Party: the lack of leadership, the discouragement of party members due to the control of a number of specific individuals against the party's powers, the establishment of restrictions by government officials The majority of the membership is the New Iranian Party, the financial weakness due to non-payment of membership fees by party members, the influence of the state party (the New Iran party under the protection of the government of Hoveida) in the election of parliamentarians, the lack of ideology, and the lack of attitude of the intellectual class The party, the weakness of the management and organization of the leadership and the executive, and ultimately the specific situation of the Iranian society

in terms of the activities of political parties The fact is that the determination of the above-mentioned factors is a cover for escaping from the true cause, namely the party's dependence on the king and the system. (Ghaffar Marandi, 1395: 46-45).

The most important Islamic parties and individuals opposed to left-wing and right-wing parties

During the years when the traditional Shah's opponents were silenced, he had another form of struggle for the Shah's regime. While with the decisive victory of the coup of August 28, 1332 and suppressing the June 15 uprising in 1342, anti-colonial struggles in Iran seemed to have stalled, in other parts of the world, anti-imperialist movements had achieved significant victories. . In the eyes of the young and radical generation after 1332, "liberating" struggles in China, Cuba, Vietnam, Algeria and Egypt have been able to put heavy blows on global imperialism. From the perspective of this generation, the secret of these victories was in the proper leadership, the implementation of the principled strategy and tactics, and the adoption of a revolutionary ideology in the course of their struggle. Features that were not seen by the fighters after 1342 among the opponents of the Shah's regime, which led to successive defeats of anti-colonial struggles in Iran. The brutal murder of the people during the suppression of the June 15 uprising and the widespread opposition of the masses in the months following the uprising made it clear that the more radical and younger elements of the opposition were confronted with the formulation of the struggle.

Of the groups that set up parallel to the "mutually exclusive" but independent, "Islamic Nations Party", the party was founded in 1340 by its leader, and the activities for recruiting began in the years 1343 and 1344. In a short time, he was able to attract a number of young religious forces totaling 55, but after the arrest and arrest of all members, it quickly ended, and only its leaders remained for years in the Shah's regime's prisons. (Jafarian, 1390: 471-470).

The group tried to create a secret organization and fight through a multi-stage program with the regime. Part of the program was the armed struggle with the anticipated regime. But SAVAK succeeded at the very beginning of the group's work in 1344 and arrested all its members within a few weeks before they succeeded in carrying out an operation. Leader of the group, Seyyed Kazem Bojnourdi, was sentenced to life imprisonment, and other members of the leadership, including Mohammad Mir Mohammad Sadeghi, Abolghasem Sarhadizadeh, Seyyed Mahmoudi, Hashim Ayatollah Zadeh, and ... were sentenced to heavy imprisonment.

One of the defendants of this group was Hojatoleslam Sheikh Mohammad Javad Hojjati Kermani, who was sentenced to 10 years. Out of a total of nearly 80 people arrested, 55 were convicted and the rest were released. The members and associate members of the "Islamic Nations Party", although "binding" to Islam, were different in terms of their social composition with "Mutualefaha". The members of Mutualefaha, as mentioned earlier, formed medium and small markets. But the "People's Party" was more educated and deeper. In addition, unlike many members of the "Moteleafe" who had campaign records, the "National Party" was mostly young and lacking political experience. (Ziba Kalam, 1395: 261-260). The next group, which was far smaller than the previous two, came under the name of the "People's Liberation Front" of Jama. Unlike the two previous groups, Jama's founders formed more intellectuals and people with university education. The other distinction between Jama and the other two groups in nationalist tendencies was the translation of some of the foreign works on armed struggle. Jama 'was identified as other groups before he succeeded in taking political action or taking an important step, and all members were arrested in 1344. Finally, some members of Mutalifa, such as Seyed Asadollah Lajevardi, Sadeq Islami, Hajj Mehdi Shafiq, Haj Mortaza Lajevardi, Hajj Asadullah Badamchian, etc., who were found to have been or were not tried in principle during the arrest of members in 1343, With the advent of the Mojahedin organization in 1350, they went to work with it. This was also the case with the "National Party". In addition, some of the remnants of the two groups formed a "Hezbollah" organization in the late 1340s that were identified and arrested before a new group could take effective action. (Ziba Kalam, 1395: 261). Ezat Shahi speaks of a formation called Iran's National Liberation Front on the years following the Khordad 42 movement, which is a continuation of the struggles that continue in the form of religious and combat children and are willing to join a coalition with the Mujahedin-e Khalq or the group Other politics of this period. Ali al-Qaeda This move must be the same religious wing of the middle section of the individuals affiliated to the Freedom Movement with a mix of sympathizers and market players that Jalaluddin Fars talked about in his memoirs. The words of dignity are about children who were active in the practical struggle and on the scene. He says members of the group reached 47 in the 47-48 years. The burning of the arches of government supporters was at the feast of the shah's coronation, the spread of the proclamations of Imam and others, mainly on opposition to the imperial system, the August 28 coup and US influence in Iran. During the 49-year-long football match that the Israeli team had faced, the group broadcasted more than 10,000 announcements and tracks amongst the people

each night. At the end of the race, they burned some police cars and set fire to the al-Aall airline on the villa. He was named after his followers named after Ahmad Karroubi (after the revolution with Faraghan and killed in a street clash), Amir Lashkari, Mostafa Sattari, Mohammad Reza Moghaddam and Hassan Kolahdoozan. (Jafarian, 1390: 468). During the years 43-57, in many mosques in Tehran, there were delegations that had a political orientation, and SAVAK had formed a political case for most of them. One of these delegations was a delegation of revolutionaries who held frequent meetings at different homes, and Shahid Mahallati and other preachers, such as Seyyed Ahmed Gibreel, on March 43 and 44, were one of the official speakers of those meetings, which typically featured political content and SAVAK has kept reports of those issues. Another example was the United Arab Emirates Ansar al-Quran, where localities spoke. Among other political groups, Ansar al-Hussein was one of the most active political groups, and lectures, with the exception of the neighborhoods, Mr. Hashemi Rafsanjani, and with art at their weekly meetings. (Jafarian, 1390: 469).

The publishers of religious and political works at the height of the pressures of that era played an important role in the transfer of new concepts to the new generation. Some of the old publishers, such as Islamiya bookstore, were from the Ketabchi family, Dar al-Katub al-Islamiyah of the Akhundi family, Salmayyah Islamiyah publications, and Kaleh Khavar Ramazani, etc., who printed the works of Hadith, Quranic and prayer. But at the same time as the feeling of the need for the publication of new political-religious affairs began, activities began in the 1920's, which were more developed in the thirties. Later in the 40's, these activities were expanded, Qom was also active. Again, in the early 1950s, dozens of small, but active, publishers appeared in Tehran, Ghom, Mashhad and Tabriz in the publication of religious-political works. Here is a brief overview of the most important of them, and it goes without saying that the foreshadowing and delays in them are not the reason for the importance.

Islamic devotees also played an important role in strengthening Islamic values and used many of the gaps left by the parties in the years to come. One of the main attractions of the devotees of Islam was their commitment and sacredness to religious principles and religious sense of responsibility. Almost all of these features have been quoted from the devotees, especially the Nawabs, for the devotion to worship and other religious manifestations. This issue attracted many of the religious youth of that time to the Fedaians. Their behavior, especially against religious deviations, was very serious, so that if anyone saw them from outside, they would see them extremely sentimental. The religious and religious sensitivities of the Fadaiyan group and

their personal devotion were very effective in attracting special forces among the religious. The courage and true religious trust that they have in their actions should be mentioned in the row of these characteristics.

Why Islamists Oppose Left-Right and Right-wing Associations in 1974-1357

The regime (the Shah) had been implementing social and economic modernization policies since the early 1940s, which resulted in the emergence of new classes and social groups with different political and social demands than the past, one of the most important of them The desire to participate in politics has been, and all the while, Mohammad Reza Shah has forgotten the reforms in politics and power. Therefore, while the political system required a high level of institutionalization in order to adequately respond to these demands and to attract new groups, the Shah, with the expansion of his own power and the weakening and suppression of independent parties, prevented the participation of social forces, which, in total, Closed the communication between the political system and the people and further increased the gap between the government and the new social forces and led the regime to collapse (Abbaszadeh Marzbali, 1392: 126-125).

Since the beginning of the 1340s, due to the fact that the government, as a result of the land reform, found at least a kind of coalition of symbols with low classes, there was a change in the official ideology of the government. Therefore, it was necessary to create a new political party for these developments. This party was "The New Iran Party" (Bashiria, 2005: 110). Basically, the history of the formation of this party is based on the establishment of "the center of advancement" by Hasan Ali Mansour (from Ghandi, 2004: 274). When the progressive center of the faction formed the majority of the 21st Parliament, in 1343, it became the command of the court for the New Iran Party. The newly-elected party was taken somewhat seriously, since the founders of those trained technocrats were in Europe and the United States, many of whom considered the main pillar of the new reformist way of Mohammad Reza Shah (Katouzian, 2001: 388-389).

The New Iran Party was a court affiliated political organization that, without any independence, complexity and coherence, provided the ground for exercising control over the government, the executive branch, the political and social forces. This party was in fact the first court party to succeed in governing the legislative and executive powers, but eventually, when the Shah recognized that the new Iranian party did not function well as a tool for gaining political support

for the regime, it was accompanied by a party The people dissolved (Bashiria, 2005: 89-88) and created a one-party military system.

The political failure of non-religious trends and insights virtually leads to a newer ideology, a stream that can overcome this political vacuum. At least part of the grounds for the emergence of that political and political Islam, that fundamentalism, and the revival of religious thought that we saw in the 1350s and during the Islamic Revolution, actually goes back to the failure of non-religious movements that could not be constituted as durable political institutions Future. These movements begin with, and with, the constitutional movement and reach the peak in the aftermath of Reza Shah. From this point onwards, these currents become more or less named in history. (Ziba Kalam, 1395: 114).

How Islamists Use the Left and Right Parties' Split In 1972-1999

If, before 1332, the universities and the educated classes were either secular reformists, or belonged to the Tudeh Party or were in a nationalist camp, then religious thought would gradually begin to break this monopoly. The architects of this transformation consisted of a group of modernist clerics and a number of religious scholars typically trained in the West of the New Science. The main character of this transformation was the late Ayatullah Taleghani and his academic character, Mr. Mehdi Bazargan. Along with these two, you should refer to the role of Ayatollah Master Morteza Motahhari in this move. The language they used to spread the word was different from that used in religious centers and among clerics. In particular, listeners, who were typically college students, tried to establish a unity between science and religion and raise Islam in relation to the requirements of the present world. In addition, issues such as governance, economy, political system and the role of social dimensions of religion also enter the realm of this movement. In the first few years, the first Islamic student associations at the university level, as well as Islamic associations of engineers and doctors, were formed. (Ziba Kalam, 1395: 115).

The paramount index and the most important of these movements among the Islamic movements were Mujahideen. The initial mental motifs of the Mujahideen actually came to the forefront and to the ideas of Engineer Bazargan and Ayatollah Taleghani. But the Mojahedin has gone beyond the ideas of engineer Bazargan and late Taleghani to cultivate and address their ideology, and have taken up a great deal of ideas of Marxism-Leninism and try to combine these views with Islamic ideas.

Despite this dichotomy, the Mojahedin launched a movement from the late 1340s, which has grown rapidly throughout the religious struggle. But welcoming the mujahedeen among young and radical religious groups does not eliminate the dilemma of this group. This dichotomy can not last in the long run, and in practice, the Marxist slice will gradually be fueled by an Islamic piece, the practical consequence of which is Marxism, which is a major part of the leadership and a large number of Mujahedeen's cadre and leaders. The PMOI's attempt to bridge the gap between Marxism and Islam is not only a failure, but the bridge is actually damaging to the mujahideen.

Between 1345 and 1355, the Mujahideen appeared to be a leading movement for the majority of religious forces, including many clerics, who was able to defeat the spell of the struggle and honor the revolutionary believers. The dilemmas and ideological ambiguities of this move are actually buried in the light of the struggle and the immediate and urgent issues of conflict with the regime. In those years when the fighters were in a situation where there was little distance between their deaths and their lives, in such a situation, the resolution of the ideological problems and engagement in the theoretical debates, if not to say deviation from the struggle, seemed at least to be timeless and It was useless. Those Islamic militant forces that did not like the Mojahedin's ideas actually had to raise their mistakes in the small circles of their sympathizers. To put forward these shortcomings in the small circles of their sympathizers. Making these objections publicly and on a wider level, for the first time since 1354, when the PMOI's leadership is declared Marxist. Until then, the Mojahedin as an Islamic movement had attracted not only a large part of religious students and a number of militant clergy, but also in the market and among other social strata. The fourth and last Islamic movement that causes Islamic fundamentalism and the revival of Islamic thought is the late Dr. Shariati and the cultural intellectual movement that he launched. The main difference between Shariati's move and the other three was that he extended the Islamist or Islamist frontiers. If Islam had as its mainstream social thought, mostly among the clergy, students, the market and some educated people, Shariatian ideas could bring Islam to newer strata and groups. Among the more modern aether groups that were typically educated, Shariati was able to stimulate the attraction of religion. The new middle class, which saw the economic prosperity of the 1340s and the early 1350s rather than the Tudeh party, saw neither Mossadegh nor the national front, and the "Freedom Movement", rather than the Mojahedin. Imam was also a religious figure in exile in another country, and finally the regime could not hope for political participation in society, in

the words of Shari'ati, he saw a new social horizon that was open to him. Unlike the Mujahedeen who tried to take revolutionary ideas of Islam from Marxism, Shariati returned to Islam itself. He rehabilitated the forgotten Shiite concepts and gave them a new spirit full of militancy, self-sacrifice and militancy. Martyrdom, martyrdom, shi'a, commitment, school, mission, imamate, etc. The Shari'a's terms and expressions were not only widespread and radicalized, but also made them categories that obviously denied the state.

In the most desirable way, if such currents were able to attract the support of the people, this was accompanied by a series of contradictions in the political and the stage of functioning, and in the absence of a rooted and principled unity between the people and these forces, this accompaniment It could not become a comprehensive and long-lasting social and intellectual movement. And we could see that our intellectual - if it could have kept its health - it was imperative that it alone entered the stage of resolving political contradictions. And among them there were people who were deprived of proper and social guidance.

In this regard, Ebrahim Yazdi says: Experience in the National Front of the United States and cooperation with the Iranian Students Organization in the United States showed that our religious intellectuals of national-Islamic activists must first have time and power in identifying and communicating with Muslim students and Islamic people and organize them. The National Front was a combination of people with religious, anti-religious or non-religious orientations. While in the organization of the national front, the religious elements (Chamran, Ghotbzadeh, Nakhshob, Biranwand, Mafi and myself) had accepted the highest responsibility, but with anti-religious elements, the left and the masses, we were constantly involved in a nervous war. Especially after the clerics disagreed with the women's rights movement and the division of lands in the White Shah's Revolution and the suppression of the uprising of June 15, 1962, the left-wing and affiliated members of the Tudeh Party had targeted not only clerics but also Islam.

At first, we tried to tackle these attacks with serious and persistent work; secondly, with documented lectures, their responses to Islam and their neutrality would be countered. Since I and Chamran lived near New Jersey, we had the opportunity to meet and discuss. We put together in response to the attacks of the left elements on Islamic thought under the pretext of the White Shah's Revolution and the opposition of clerics to women's rights, to defend our original Islamic thought and to present ourselves in lectures at the Iranian New York Periodic Meetings. (Yazdi, Beyta: 71).

Ebrahim Yazdi also considers the role of Ayatollah Taleghani in exposing the nature of the leftist parties and says that one of the most effective and culture-building programs for students and young people was Quranic interpretations sessions at Ayatullah Taleghani mosque in Hedayat Mosque on Friday nights. The program of these meetings and the late Taleqani's absorbent person was such that it attracted young people. The late Taleqani did not have any of the behavioral norms of the clerics of his era, especially their sense of transcendence. It was very dirty. In addition, he had a clear mindset. She talked very well with young people. He carefully listened to their questions and responded with dignity and elegance. Additionally, Taleqani was more or less familiar with new scientific, political, and cultural issues and used the scientific knowledge of the day in his Qur'anic discussions. This way of understanding the Qur'an, added to the charm of interpretation for young people and students. In place of a valuable commentary on the Qur'an, there is a collaboration between the Qur'an of Divine Word and scientific knowledge. This was a very useful and controversial issue in a period in which the dominant atmosphere in academic environments of religion or religion and the main claim of some non-religious intellectuals as well as religious traditionalists was an irreconcilable conflict between religion and science. In addition, Taleqani was a political cleric. At that time, clerics generally showed the least attention to political issues. The politicization of Taleqani led to the fact that many clerics and imams of the mosques did not have a good relationship with them. Taleqani was not only politically, but heavily righteous, and read the verses of the Qur'an about his economic oppression and injustice, and explained that he was tucking the listener to his place. One time after the coup d'état of August 28th, when he was taken to a military command, he was accused of interrogating that he "reads the communist verses of the Quran for the youth." Since the anti-religious thoughts of the Marxist Left were dominant atmospheres in the university, and one of the axes of propaganda was the application of this trend, the struggle against oppression and class divisions, and the establishment of justice and equality, Taleqani was one of the clergymen of the classical Marxists And other economists. His product, in addition to the lecture, was published as an exquisite book of Islam and property. Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Baqir Sadr was another cleric who, by writing a valuable "Economist" book, showed his mastery in his new economic thought, including Marxism. (Yazdi, Beyta: 168-167). The gap between traditional and modern forces appeared in the two years of the revolution in the form of two major Islamic and non-Islamic tendencies. Naturally, disputes within the block of traditional-Islamic forces could have emerged when the

initial queue task was clarified. The most important formations of the traditional bloc As we said before, the clergy's clergy society in Tehran was a community of lecturers from Qom and the Islamic Republic Party. In contrast, the modern bloc's organizations, including the National Front, the Freedom Movement, and the militant Muslim movement did not accept the Islamic jurisprudence's interpretation of the Islamic jurisprudence or did not at all agree on the combination of religion and state. Therefore, the Islamic Republic, in its jurisprudential interpretation, despite the support of the masses, was not based on the consensus and consensus of political forces active in the government. Naturally, left-wing radical groups also did not have the capacity to determine the form of government. Thus, at the level of the social classes, there was a clear advance between the traditional classes and mobilized masses on the one hand and the new middle class, which formed the social base of modern tendencies. (Bashirieh, 1392: 79-78).

On the other hand, the influential Islamists were Mehdi Bazargan. Ezatollah Sahabi says: Apart from the issue of accelerating or curbing the revolution, another disagreement between the late Bazargan was his opposition to leftism. Before we got out of jail, we were informed about events outside of prison. Among the members of the Mujahideen said that Bazargan engineer opposes the people's movement. Among other things, they referred to the speech of the late Bazargan, referred to as the Pests of Tawhid, who had been criticized at Ghaba Mosque during Ramadan in the year of 56. In that speech, the late Bazargan argued that some of Marxist and Leninist conceptions had originated. Among the concepts referred to was Bazargan's engineer, the term imperialism. Engineer Bazargan believed that the term used by Lenin and repeated by religious people was not the correct word. Instead of imperialism, we should use the word "foreign insignia". Another disagreement between the late Bazargan and others was over colonialism and despotism. (Sahabi, 1392: 42).

He also believes that: According to the deceased Bazargan, the main enemy of the Iranian people was despotism, which, in addition to the political effects on the life of this border, also had a significant cultural and social impact on the morale and behavior and in general the culture of the people We left behind. In this regard, a 500-page pamphlet of historical analysis was also prepared by him, which was given to me after being released from prison. In the pamphlet of Bazargan, while reviewing the historical history of the Iranian people from the time of the Achaemenid to the present day, examples of abuses, tyranny, trampling down on the rights of the people and ... during the two thousand and five hundred years of kingship rule,

concluded that Iran has been captive of tyranny for 2500 years, and as a result of this long rule of despotism, naturally, people's thoughts and morals and morals and culture have been dictated by tyranny. And in order to be reformed in the country, it is necessary to create fundamental changes in thoughts, morale, and in general the culture of the people. This change is also possible for a long time, when the objective factor of creating these weaknesses is autocracy, and so our main struggle must be despotism. (Sahabi, 1392: 43).

Emam Khomeini, as the leader of the Islamists, was able, through unity and harmony among the Islamist currents, to use the gap between the left and right leavers. Imam's movement not only strengthened the waves of returning to Islam among educated and student classes, but also created historical changes in the relationship between religion and politics and religion and government in Iran. First, although before the early 1340s and the advent of the Imam, both during the nationalist movement and apart from it, in the form of the deceased Ayatollah Modares, the Fadaean of Islam, the late Ayatollah Kashani and the late Ayatollah Taleghani, the clerics were present in the struggle, but as We said that the leadership of the movements was in general in the hands of non-religious movements. Other clerics who participated in the struggle, although sometimes even called "Ayatullah", were not the imams of the clergy. Their struggle was out of context and the clerical pyramid. In fact, from the time of the constitution, it was for the first time that it was such a fierce struggle for a sovereign to immitate and an Ayatollah, in the name of the rule of law in particular. In holding the leadership of the struggle and moving from the standpoint of Ayatollah Imam Ali, in the struggle of the Imam with the regime, we will produce results that are by no means seen in the struggles of the former clerics.

Conclusion

From the perspective of the Islamists, during the period from 1342 to 1357 parties often opposed the suppression of the party. In addition, many of the emerging parties during this period were in the interest of foreign countries or emerged on the basis of the will of the government (such as the Rastakiz Party). Therefore, the emergence of opposing views on the activities of parties in such a space should not be so surprising. The Islamists led by the clerics who saw these conditions and knew how these parties formed, were opposed to the party and partyism at that time period, because the emergence of parties in Iran was a conspiracy from other countries and the perceptions they did. The clergy believed that the main purpose of creating the party was to entertain people and create differences between them to plunder the

resources and wealth of the country. The most important emphasis of the Imam in different periods of time was on the preservation of unity and, in other words, the unity of the word, and the clergy considered unity as the greatest force against the foreign powers and the enemies of Islam and revolution, which the clergy, in an explicit statement, pre-revolutionary parties As a factor in destroying the unity of the people and creating unrealistic gaps in the society. On the other hand, the emergence of the Rastakhiz Party by the government and the proclamation of a single-party system in the country, and the hypocrisy of the party on the one hand, and forced membership in it, on the other hand, prompted the Islamists' anger and caused the opposition of the clergy and Islamists to be overwhelming And in particular the Rastakhis Party. The clergy considered the formation of this party and forced membership in it as a reason for the repression of the regime of the Shah. In this way, the regime intended to deny the resistance of the people to the government, therefore, it considered the party as opposed to Islam and the interests of the Iranian nation, and to participate in Announced it forbidden.

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